Trotha, Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, Colonel Karl W.
In addition to the above-listed home workers, the following persons were included:įrom the Army High Command Generalmajor Erich Dethlefsen, General-major Illo von Operations Branch of the Army General Staff.Ĭolonel Gerhard Roos, Jenaer Strasse 9, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, formerly Chief of Staff ofĬolonel Hans-Oscar Woehlermann, Geldernstrasse 48, Koeln-Nippes, formerly Artillery Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich de Maizieres, Argelander Strasse 105, Bonn, formerly in the Their contributions have been compiled by him and are included under his name in the supporting studies. Leader of a circle of contributors consisting of eight former fellow-combatants livingin Berlin. I attach great importance to this study from the standpoint of military history and concur with the military opinions expressed by the author.Ĭolonel Guenther Hartung, Uetzersteig 12 - 14, Berlin-Gatow, Colonel Hartung was the He goes beyond the more narrow concept of planning and offers the first German account of the defense of Berlin to be based upon thorough research.
The author describes these conditions in a clear, accurate report which I rate very highly. These reveal a state of total confusion in which the pressure of the enemy, the organizational chaos on the German side, and the catastrophic shortage of human and material resources for the defense combined with disastrous effect. Thus the city's defense was characterized only by a mass of improvisations.
Circumstances were such that he gave no thought to defending the city until it was much too late for any kind of advance planning. All that existed was the stubborn determination of Hitler to defend the capital of the Reich. No cohesive, over-all plan for the defense of Berlin was ever actually prepared. FRANZ HALDERįOREWORD by Generaloberst a.D.
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